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Message from the President
This 2005 Overview is a new Report prepared by Operations Evaluation, now  part of the 
independent Inspectorate General Department.  It demonstrates the Bank’s achieve-
ments through the retrospective analysis of projects financed by the Bank. These analy-
ses are based on International Criteria, agreed with other multilateral financial institu-
tions, which are consistent with the Bank’s three pillars of Value Added.
I note that Operations Evaluation’s conclusions based on these International Criteria of 
Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability confirm that the EIB’s contribution 
to the projects and its management of the project cycle are generally in the Good or 
Satisfactory categories.  Nevertheless, there are still opportunities for improvement as 
some scores fall below that.  Some of these are suggested by the recommendations that 
are further elaborated in the six synthesis reports that Operations Evaluation issued to 
the Board of Directors during 2005.
I therefore underline the lessons that are there to be learnt and the importance of im-
plementing the recommendations that have been made, especially in the context of the 
new strategy of the Bank approved by our Board of Governors in June 2005.
Philippe Maystadt
President of the EIB
OPERATIONS EVALUATION
This report summarises the view of Operations Evaluation (EV) on how the Bank con-
ducts its operations. It is based on 92 project / loan evaluations which were captured in 
six thematic reports that can be found on the EIB website (www.eib.org/projects/evalu-
ation). The six themes relate to:
• Loans to Air Infrastructure projects;
• Loans to Railways projects;
• Loans for Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects;
• Global loans to SMEs in the EU;
• Loans to individual projects in the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs);
• Global loans for SME financing in the MPCs.
Through this publication, the Inspectorate General wishes to enhance communication 
on EIB activities and to highlight both areas of success and areas where progress can 
still be made.
The report covers:
•  Policies and strategies: how relevant are the operations to EU policies, EIB strategies 
and beneficiaries’ requirements?
•  What is the performance of the operations financed in terms of effectiveness, effi-
ciency and sustainability?
• What is the EIB contribution to the success of these operations?
•  Is the EIB both efficient and effective in the management of the project cycle from 
identification to completion?
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1.  PURPOSE AND 
BACKGROUND
Purpose: 
The 2005 overview report synthesizes 
the findings of the EIB’s Operations 
Evaluation Department (EV) during the 
2005 exercise.
These were made through 92 project/
loan evaluations which were captured 
in six thematic ex post evaluations pub-
lished in 2005:
•  Air Infrastructure projects (mainly in 
the EU)
• Railways projects in the EU (EU15)
•  PPP (Public Private Partnership) 
projects
•  SME global loans in the Enlarged 
Union (EU25)
•  Global loans in the MPCs 
(Mediterranean Partner Countries) 
• Individual loans to projects in MPCs
Methodology 
EIB operations are assessed using internationally accepted 
evaluation criteria and include an examination of EIB per-
formance (see also Annex).
•  “Relevance” measures the extent to which the objectives 
of a project are consistent with EU policies and EIB strat-
egies, as well as country or beneficiaries requirements.
•  Project Performance is assessed on three criteria:
 •  “Effectiveness”:  the extent to which the objec-
tives of the projects have been achieved;
 •  “Efficiency”: the extent to which project benefits 
/ outputs are commensurate with resources / 
inputs;
 •  “Sustainability”: the likelihood of continued 
long-term benefits and the resilience to risk over 
the intended life of the project.
•  EIB contribution is measured through the EIB financial 
value added; other EIB contributions, such as Technical 
Assistance or expert advice can also be identified.
•  EIB management of the project cycle: rates the Bank’s 
handling of the operations, from project identification to 
post-completion monitoring.
On each criterion, projects are rated on a 4-step scale: 
Good - Satisfactory - Unsatisfactory - Poor.
Thematic ex-post evaluations consider a range of operations 
financed under the focus concerned. When editing syn-
thesis reports, EV is also considering how EU policies have 
been translated into the Bank’s guidelines and priorities, and 
thereafter into operations. From the findings, EV proposes a 
series of recommendations.  The Bank’s services comment on 
these and agree on specific actions that need to be taken.
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Role of EV:
Operations Evaluation carries out ex post 
evaluations in the EIB; its manager, the 
Inspector General, is answerable to the 
President; EV’s reports are submitted 
to the Board of Directors and then pub-
lished on the EIB’s website.
The objective of an evaluation is to assess 
the Bank’s operations with a view to iden-
tifying both the impact of the projects it 
has funded, and opportunities to improve 
operational performance, accountability 
and transparency
The approach of the evaluations 
presented:
Each evaluation is based on a theme (rail, 
etc.) or on a mandate. In the prepara-
tion of each evaluation, EV considered 
the portfolio of signed operations be-
tween 1990 and 2001 for large projects 
and between 1993 and 2003 for other 
types of operations, in order to allow 
sufficient time for the projects to be im-
plemented. The respective portfolios 
were very large: EUR 7 bn for air infra-
structure projects, EUR 14 bn for rail-
ways, EUR 14.7 bn for PPP operations and 
EUR 12.7 bn for projects (individual and 
global loans) in the MPCs. 
A comprehensive review of these portfo-
lios was then undertaken, the main pur-
pose of which was to:
• Identify and elaborate on the main 
issues;
• Analyse the strategies and the poli-
cies (both EU and EIB) in the themes 
concerned;
• Collect all the necessary information 
for the next steps.
From the review of completed projects 
based on the documentation available, 
the main focuses of in-depth evaluation 
were defined. 
A final list of representative projects was 
selected for in-depth analysis, with on-
site visits and detailed evaluation. These 
normally represent between 15% and 
25% of the initial population identified. 
For the above evaluations, EV considered 
19 projects for the air infrastructure sec-
tor, 16 for the railways, 10 for PPPs, and 
32 in the MPCs (of which 22 are individual 
projects and 10 global loans). The SME 
global loan evaluation dealt with 15 glo-
bal loans representing 15 financial inter-
mediaries spread over 14 countries.
This report will also present several case 
studies in order to illustrate the results of 
the various evaluations implemented.
OPERATIONS EVALUATION
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2.  POLICIES AND 
STRATEGIES: 
RELEVANCE OF THE 
OPERATIONS
Evaluations take account of the strategies 
and policies that related to the operations 
evaluated at the time the operation was 
appraised and approved. Having identi-
fied, when justified, sector or mandate 
characteristics, EV evaluated the impact 
of EU regulations on projects and com-
panies, and even the constraints, in or-
der to define challenges facing the EIB. 
Based on this analysis, the relevance of 
the operations in relation to EU policies, 
EIB strategies and beneficiaries’ require-
ments are assessed.
2.1.  EV findings in air 
infrastructure and 
railways sector
In 2005, two individual sectors were evalu-
ated: air infrastructure (i.e. airports and air 
traffic management – ATM), and railways 
in the EU.
Air infrastructure:
The sector has been characterised by 
strong traffic growth (+ 40% between 
1995 and 2005) requiring the expan-
sion of airport capacity, and by a rapidly 
changing air transport market, involving 
bankruptcies as well as the rise of low-
cost carriers. Pressure on airport capacity 
is likely to persist.
EU initiatives were aimed at the liberali-
sation of the air services, the free circula-
tion of citizens (Schengen) and air safety 
regulations. The main constraint on the 
sector will be environmental concerns 
over airport development (operations 
and construction).
The challenge for the EIB is to give prior-
ity to investments which increase the ef-
ficiency of airports, taking into account 
all regional developments foreseeable in 
the same region.
Railways:
Over the last 20 to 30 years, the sector 
has been characterised not only by stag-
nation of its capacity but also by a sig-
nificant loss of market share: from 32 to 
14% in freight and 10 to 6% in passenger 
transport.
On the positive side, rail transport is en-
vironmentally less damaging than other 
modes of transportation, socially more 
acceptable, and can offer some economic 
advantages. On the negative side, the 
lack of flexibility, fiscal and policy distor-
tions, and institutional problems related 
to state monopolies favoured road and 
air transport; the sector also shows weak-
nesses such as inefficient management 
and the lack of international integration.
EU support has been continuous, through 
many regulations aiming at increased 
competition and the progressive liberali-
sation of the sector, but the implementa-
tion of these is low and uneven amongst 
EU countries. The EIB has given, and will 
likely continue to give, full support to 
the sector. Therefore, it is essential that 
the Bank works closely with all parties 
concerned.
Relevance of air infrastructure and 
railways projects:
The Bank’s lending has taken proper ac-
count of both EU transport policies and 
EIB objectives and operational priorities. 
All the projects were in line with the cor-
responding national priorities of growth 
(air infrastructure) and modernisation/vi-
ability (railways).
For projects financed in the European 
Union, 85% were part of the TEN while 
others were justified for the growth of 
less developed regions; outside the EU, 
the Bank financed projects of common 
interest between the EU and non-mem-
ber countries. Two projects (out of 35) 
received a lower rating, the first one be-
cause it provided premature capacity and 
the second one because it was more justi-
fied by local considerations than by com-
mon EU interest.
Given the high level of relevance ratings, 
EV recommendations are essentially aim-
ing at increasing the Bank’s involvement 
in the early stage of policies and strat-
egies preparation.
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Recommendations 
(at sector level)1 
•  In the financing of airport infra-
structures, strategy reviews for 
regions or areas where multiple 
investments are foreseen should 
be prepared, thus enabling the 
development of appropriate lend-
ing priorities.
   The consideration of the 
broader context of an airport 
investment is now an integral 
part of the appraisal of airport 
projects.
•  The Bank should increase its con-
tribution in the railway sector by 
strengthening its participation 
with the relevant Commission/
Parliament/member state com-
mittees dealing with railway poli-
cies and projects.
   The dialogue with the 
Commission has been rein-
forced with the establish-
ment of a Memorandum of 
Understanding with DG TREN. 
The Bank is now also involved 
in the project preparation of 
large scale cross border projects 
(Lyon-Turin). Policy dialogue 
should continue to be rein-
forced but will necessarily face 
resource constraints.
1  Throughout this paper, EV recommendations will be followed by 
the answers (in terms of proposed or already achieved actions at 
the end of 2005) of the Bank’s directorates concerned.
Case study:
Evaluation of the financing of 
18 airports in the EU –
Extracts from the 
Air Infrastructure Evaluation
These 18 projects are spread over 8 countries: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. They concerned mostly the moderni-
sation and expansion of existing facilities; new airports were only funded on envi-
ronmental grounds or if the existing facilities were wholly unsuitable for modern air 
services.
EU strategies were duly taken into consideration in all projects, which were also in 
line with national objectives; all of them have a TEN status. The evaluation took into 
account sector characteristics such as air traffic growth of almost 40% (1995 to 2002) 
requiring the expansion of airport capacities, changes in the airline industry such 
as bankruptcies and the rise of low-cost carriers. The liberalisation of air services 
(through EU initiatives) will significantly increase competition between airports and 
future development will also be impacted by existing factors such as environmental 
restrictions.
In this context, future EIB financing in this area should look at regional multi devel-
opment enabling to develop appropriate lending priorities.
The implementation of all the projects is satisfactory, reflecting the quality of the 
promoters while efficiency varies according to traffic growth observed; in most cas-
es, traffic growth was initially higher than expected, then impaired by 9/11, followed 
by a slow recovery, leading to an overall satisfactory performance, except for airports 
in remote places where traffic growth expectations were overestimated.
OPERATIONS EVALUATION
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Recommendations
To demonstrate more clearly the 
Bank’s support to EU policy objec-
tives, the Bank should:
• Present clear, deliverable objec-
tives for each global loan;
• Clarify its own SME policy 
objectives.
  The new appraisal framework for 
global loans now in place requests 
a better formalisation of objectives 
and ex post performance assess-
ment. 
Furthermore, the Bank has included 
SME financing as one of its core 
priorities in its recent strategy 
paper, which has been viewed at 
the level of the EIB Group (Towards 
a new Strategy for the EIB Group, 20 
June 2005).
2.3.  Financing of SMEs through 
global loans in the EU
In order to fund small investments 
(meaning, for the EIB in the EU, less than 
EUR 25 m), a global loan is made to a 
financial intermediary (FI), which in turn 
provides funding to its smaller clients, the 
final beneficiaries. The FI is responsible 
for identifying the client, appraising and 
approving their fund request, distribut-
ing and monitoring the sub-loans; the FI 
takes the credit risk.
Relevance:
The 15 global loans evaluated in depth, 
as well as the 10 other global loans which 
were reviewed in-house, were in con-
formity with the established objectives 
(rating: good and satisfactory).
All the operations evaluated were in-
tended to fund investments by SMEs, and 
many of the investments also supported 
a range of other EU policies, e.g. regional 
development, rational use of energy, etc.
However, it was difficult to demonstrate 
relevance to the EU policy of increased 
access to funding. The issue is mainly the 
lack of an adequate mechanism for as-
sessing the overall policy impact of glo-
bal loans. Nevertheless, the evaluation 
identified many examples of improved 
access, particularly in the new member 
states and with new intermediaries.
2.2.  PPP: Public Private 
Partner ship
Definition:
Private sector contribution and opera-
tions of infrastructure which should other-
wise have been provided by the public 
sector.
The growth of PPPs may be seen as being 
part of a wider change in the role of the 
State from a direct provider of services 
to that of a facilitator and regulator. The 
role of the EIB has been increasing over 
time and results as being one of the larg-
est lenders to PPPs in the EU: total loans 
signed between 1990 and 2003 amount 
to EUR 14.7 bn, 62% being in the road 
and motorway sector with the remainder 
spread over various other areas. This evalu-
ation examined ten projects in depth, 
as well as considering PPPs included in 
other evaluations; EV considered projects 
in a large variety of sectors: roads (and 
motorways), rail, energy (production and 
generation) and education. 
The evaluation has not analysed the sec-
tors as such, but focused on the impacts 
of the PPP mechanism on the projects 
and on the EIB (see also chapter 4 and the 
case study “Evaluation highlights of the 
year”). The approach was different from 
other evaluations carried out by EV. As 
well as evaluating the project’s impact, 
the structure and risk sharing mecha-
nisms involved in the PPPs were put at 
the heart of the evaluation.
Relevance:
All PPP projects were in line with EU and 
EIB strategies in the sectors concerned 
and were fully compatible with the coun-
try objectives, including strategy for the 
privatisation of these sectors.
OVERVIEW REPORT 2005  9
Case study:
Global loan for SME financing in the EU
The Bank has long standing relations with the Financial Intermediary (FI) concerned, 
almost exclusively through repeated global loans (the first one being granted in 
1988, the evaluated one being signed in 2000), unlike other FIs which often serve 
also as guarantors or intermediaries for larger operations. 
The FI is a local organisation with a large number of local branches. Its natural con-
stituency is the SME, the FI having little exposure to large companies. 
The FI is considered fully sustainable; continuous improvements are foreseen with, 
in particular, a major risk management programme under way. Non-performing 
loans are stable at a relatively high level (4.3%) for the EU, but do not create any 
problems.
The EIB global loan was disbursed and allocated quickly and exclusively for SME fi-
nance: average sub loan size is EUR 165,000.
The global loan has represented a significant part of the FI’s MLT loans and support-
ed the increase of the FI lending activity (+8% per annum). The FI has established a 
procedure to quantify the benefits (from the EIB conditions) passed on to the final 
beneficiary. The EIB financial value added was considered significant although the FI 
management expressed some concerns over pricing for the future.
2.4.  EIB financing in the 
Mediterranean Partner 
Countries (MPC)
The EIB activities in the Southern and 
Eastern non-member countries of the 
Mediterranean region have developed 
within the framework of the mandates 
given by the EU to the Bank. The level 
of EU assistance and co-operation to 
the region has widened and deepened 
over time, which has also led to a more 
prominent role for the EIB. The setting 
up of the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean 
Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) in 
2002 is the latest development, again in-
creasing the Bank’s lending activity in the 
region and placing a particular emphasis 
on helping to foster the development of 
the private sector.
This evaluation covers EIB financing with 
own resources during the period 1993 
– 2003. The Bank signed 272 operations, 
the bulk of which were on own resources. 
Own resource lending reached EUR 12.7 
bn, with the main recipient countries be-
ing Turkey (21%), Egypt (17%), Morocco 
(16%), Algeria (14%) and Tunisia (13%). 
Energy, transport, water and sewerage 
sectors received the largest share, while 
the financing of SMEs through global 
loans represented about 13% of the total.
The main objectives set up in the man-
dates, in particular following the 1995 
Barcelona Declaration, can be summa-
rised as follows:
•  Upgrading of economic infrastructure, 
including that necessary to encourage 
inter-regional trade such as telecom-
munications, transport and power;
•  Private sector development, includ-
ing support to SMEs and to joint in-
vestments between the EU and MPCs’ 
enterprises.
OPERATIONS EVALUATION
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Recommendations
The Bank should establish de-
tailed lending priorities in cooper-
ation and coordination with MPCs 
and other stakeholders such as 
the European Commission and 
other donors, including secto-
ral and country strategies when 
appropriate.:
  Sector and country work is 
now under implementation 
under the FEMIP, with country 
papers under preparation and 
sector strategies (specifically 
for infrastructure projects). 
In addition, Memorandums 
of Understanding have been 
signed with the EC, the IBRD 
and the AfDB
Support FIs that aim at develop-
ing financing to smaller enter-
prises, when necessary by setting 
support programmes.
  Financing smaller enterprises 
was not a specific objective of 
the MED mandates. Under the 
new FEMIP, instruments are 
provided to contribute to this 
objective although the final 
responsibility (and risk taking) 
is with the FIs.
Relevance:
All the individual projects and all the glo-
bal loans evaluated are considered as rel-
evant (satisfactory or better).
In general, all the operations financed 
have contributed to economic growth 
and to job creation.
The infrastructure projects have contrib-
uted to covering the basic needs of the 
population, or to overcoming substantial 
economic development bottlenecks of 
the respective MPCs. Industrial projects 
supported the development of the pri-
vate sector in the region. 
The global loans mostly targeted SMEs 
and contributed equally to the develop-
ment of the private sector, while some 
different objectives were also included, 
i.e. such as upgrading economic infra-
structure, environmental investments 
and energy-saving investments by enter-
prises. The evaluation shows that the EIB 
definition of SMEs often relates to large 
entities in MPCs and further attention 
should be devoted to smaller companies.
2.5. Relevance in a nutshell
97% of the projects were considered as 
fully relevant (good or satisfactory) which 
demonstrates the strong coherence be-
tween the operations financed by the 
Bank and EU policies translated in the 
Bank’s strategy.
This confirms the observation made be-
tween 2001 and 2004 on 6 major evalu-
ations, where equally 95% of the opera-
tions evaluated were fully relevant.
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Case study: 
Financing the private sector in MPCs
The promoter was engaged in the manufacturing of intermediary products (based on local raw material) in a large MPC with 
strong local demand; the company was also significantly export oriented.
The project financed included the modernisation of an existing plant and the construction of a new one allowing the diversifica-
tion in the same sector.
To that end, the family-owned company developed a joint venture with a European partner for both technical expertise and com-
mercial partnership. After some initial difficulties, this co-operation has significantly contributed to the borrower’s exports.
The EIB financing contributed to the development of the private sector and was fully in line with EU / EIB and country objectives: 
employment creation, integration in the EU mandate, increased competitiveness, increased foreign investments.
The project was implemented below budget in 2 phases, the second being delayed given the economic slowdown of the country. 
Profitability, both financial and economic, was above 40%, more than expected at appraisal.
The company is now fully sustainable and has repaid the participation indirectly financed by the EIB (at the initial value in euro 
although the local currency has been devaluated by 50%). The borrower considered the EIB financial value added high with both 
an equity participation and a long term loan with significant grace period. Nevertheless, the promoter had difficulties in renewing 
the guarantee and had some criticism of  the EIB’s policy of not taking project risk.
Given the high degree of EIB involvement in the project, monitoring could have been higher.
The overall performance of this project is good, 
with a significant impact on the private sector de-
velopment and high EIB financial value added.
OPERATIONS EVALUATION
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3.  PERFORMANCE OF 
THE OPERATIONS
Looking more specifically at the in-depth 
evaluations of individual operations fi-
nanced by the Bank, EV presents its find-
ings on three criteria:
• Effectiveness: relates to the extent to 
which the objectives of the project have 
been achieved;
• Efficiency: is the measure to which 
project benefits / outputs are commensu-
rate with resources / inputs, often meas-
ured through the economic and financial 
rate of returns.
• Sustainability: is the likelihood of con-
tinued long-term benefits and the resil-
ience to risk over the intended life of the 
project.
These criteria equally apply to global 
loans, but focusing on both the perform-
ance of the Financial Intermediaries and 
the performance of the global loan as 
such.
For a global view about the performance 
of projects financed by the EIB, 6 other 
evaluations performed between 2001 
– 2004 have been considered: Energy 
(Enlarged EU), Solid Waste Projects, 
Transport in the EU, Urban Development, 
Airlines financing and the ALA (Asia, Latin 
America) Mandate. Altogether EV con-
siders that a view on almost all sectors 
financed by the EIB have been consid-
ered between 2001 and 2005 (excluding 
ACP countries which are currently being 
evaluated).
Overall, the performance of the projects 
was satisfactory or good for 77% of the 
in-depth evaluations presented in 2005 
(and 72% for the average of evaluations 
over the previous four years). 
As the sectors are totally different, the 
comparison between the 2 periods is 
only marginally relevant but the full pic-
ture provides a good reference for future 
evaluations. This result is further analysed 
below, and has led to an appropriate set 
of recommendations.
The performance of the operations in-
cluded in this 2005 overview is illustrated 
in the table below.
G/S: Good / Satisfactory
U/P/NR: Unsatisfactory / Poor / Not rated
2001-2004
Poor 5%
Not rated 1%
Satisfactory
37%
Unsatisfactory
22%
Good 35%
2005
Satisfactory
53%
Good 24%
Not rated 3%
Poor 4%
Unsatisfactory
15%
Performance criteria
In number of operations Effectiveness Efficiency Sustainability Overall
Individual operations G/S U/P/NR G/S U/P/NR G/S U/P/NR G/S U/P/NR
Air Infrastructure 16 3 11 8 17 2 13 6
Railways 12 4 8 8 15 1 11 5
PPP operations 10 6 4 7 3 8 2
MED individual 18 4 21 1 16 6 19 3
Subtotal 56 11 46 21 55 12 51 16
Global loans (GL)
SME EU global loans 15 14 1 14 1
SME MED global loans 6 4 5 5 6 4
Subtotal 21 4 19 6 20 5
Total 71 21
FI performance GL performance Overall
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3.1. Individual operations
Effectiveness: 
86% of the operations evaluated are sat-
isfactory or better.  On the whole, staff or 
promoters’ management of the projects 
were considered competent and effi-
cient, except when competence was lost 
in heavy administrative bodies.
Two factors influencing effectiveness 
have been further detailed.
•  Costs: 80% of the project costs were 
on target or with an increase of less 
than 20%, which is a satisfactory out-
come. 10% of the projects had cost in-
creases between 20 and 50%, without 
any specificity as to sector concerned. 
This was often linked to changes in the 
definition of the projects , decided by 
the promoters in order to improve the 
project scope in agreement with the 
Bank.
  Cost overruns of more than 50% are 
mostly concentrated in the railway 
sector, where the Bank often decides 
to finance a large project at a very 
early stage. These projects have fre-
quently changes in the scope of works 
and necessitate an increased monitor-
ing activity of the Bank, which has not 
always been present.
  Reduction in costs concerned 30% 
of the projects evaluated, often with 
private sector management looking 
carefully at scope and suppliers. This 
was significant in the Mediterranean 
region where half of the projects were 
below initial costs estimates, mainly 
due to scope optimisation (private 
sector) and increased competition 
(transport sector).
•  Delays: up to 1 year had a low impact 
on the success of the projects (60% of 
the evaluation). With delays between 
1 and 3 years, projects were still doing 
well when this was due to changes in 
the project definition which justified 
the delays. These cases were in gen-
eral well controlled by the project pro-
moters. Delays above 3 years are more 
problematic and it should be noted 
that these were mainly concentrated 
in two sectors: again, the railways 
sector (in all, half the projects had de-
lays of more than 1 year) and air traf-
fic management projects developed 
outside the European Union (lack of 
preparation); one project was delayed 
due to the outbreak of a civil war.
  Again the private sector has shown a 
strong control of implementation time; 
in the public sector some delays were 
justified by the difficulties to finalise 
the financing structure, the technical 
management being satisfactory.  
OPERATIONS EVALUATION
G/S U/P/NR Below 20-50% Over 
50%
Below
1 year
1-3 
years
Over
3 years
Rating Costs overrun Delays
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Measurement of Effectiveness
14  OVERVIEW REPORT 2005
Efficiency:
The financial and economic performance 
of the projects has been uneven; results 
demonstrate that more than two thirds 
of operations financed had satisfactory or 
good efficiency ratings.
In the transport sector, efficiency has 
been impacted by traffic outcomes; traf-
fic was lower than expected in 4 airport 
projects and one PPP project, which 
translated into an unsatisfactory rating. 
High cost overruns and large delays had 
a direct negative result on efficiency in 12 
projects (mainly the railway sector and 
ATM projects).
Efficiency has a favourable picture on 
completed PPP projects thanks to careful 
preparation before the Bank was officially 
engaged.
In the Mediterranean region, all projects 
except one (water sector, tariffs were not 
increased as expected) show good and 
satisfactory rating on efficiency; in gen-
eral ex post economic rates of return are 
higher than foreseen, often linked to in-
crease in revenues (prices in the energy 
sector and traffic in transport projects).
Case study: 
Financing the construction of a 
high-speed railway line
The loan was granted for the financing of a 
section (about 28%) of a long, new line. The 
project is  very large and fully in line with EU 
objectives, being a priority TEN. The project 
has experienced extensive delays (9 years) 
and is still not in operation. Scope changes
were introduced by local and regional 
author ities for realignments and environ-
mental impact mitigations. The risk of these 
delays implicitly included in the national procedures for the implementation of such 
a project, was underestimated by the promoters and the Bank. Scope changes are 
then translated into high cost overruns (estimated at over 60%).
Although unsatisfactory on costs and delays, effectiveness should be satisfactory 
regarding all factors related to the introduction of high-speed train services (capac-
ity, speed, safety and comfort).
Efficiency has been rated poor, not only because of the costs overruns, but also in 
relation with new demand forecasts well below initial estimates.
The sustainability of the project is guaranteed by the state involvement.
Given all the difficulties, the Bank decided to hire the services of a consultant for 
the monitoring of the project; this allowed the Bank to be kept informed and to 
follow carefully the changes in the institutional organisation of the whole project, 
mainly prompted by costs and delays which were no more affordable in the initial 
structure.
Despite all the implementation difficulties, in the end (i.e. once in operation), this 
should be a satisfactory investment for the client.
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Recommendations
Railways 
As the Bank is involved at an early stage, some problem areas are seen at the time of 
appraisals of the majority of railway projects:
Weak project preparation; Imprecise definition of project output; Unsystematic 
risk analysis; Unquantified external benefits (mainly environmental) used to justify 
projects.
The Bank should examine the above areas at the project identification stage, so as to 
ensure that projects with a high risk of limited economic justification are identified 
and weaknesses addressed. External benefits used in the justification of a project 
should be quantified as far as possible
  It is a fact that highly complex large-scale projects can lead to significant perform-
ance risks  during project implementation, or that rearrangements in phasing or in 
scope are introduced by responsible authorities for different reasons. These issues 
must be fully analysed at appraisal and best efforts are being made in that regard.
Air Infrastructure 
ATM projects evaluated in-depth, mainly outside the EU, show consistent implemen-
tation weaknesses and very limited incentives for economic efficiency. Appraisals 
should systematically include an analysis of project management capacity, opera-
tional efficiency and cost effectiveness of the promoter. Consideration should also 
be given to using contract conditions to require weak promoters to establish project 
implementation units.
  The findings were accepted by the Bank’s operational directorates with comments: 
“The institutional and regulatory environment can be at least as important to 
project success as implementation capacity, and should be fully analysed during 
appraisal”, “[ATM projects] are not representative of other operations in the air infra-
structure sector.”
Sustainability:
Finally, project sustainability, which offers 
a better picture, is particularly influenced 
by 2 factors:
• Competent promoters which can turn 
around the project quality;
• State support which can transform a 
defaulter project into a viable one.
3 projects were not rated under this cri-
teria (projects far from being implemented).
6 public sector projects in the MPCs have 
low rating on sustainability. In this region, 
the State is not always strong enough 
to compensate for deficiencies. This is in 
particular the case for 4 water projects, 
where tariffs are too low and the water 
companies face permanent shortcuts in 
their financial equilibrium, which darken 
future perspectives.
On the other hand, even low perform-
ing infrastructure projects (e.g. railways 
in the EU) on efficiency are sustainable. 
The State involvement is high, covering 
financial gaps and ensuring completion 
and start-up of the projects, even after 
huge delays.
Airport projects show in their large major-
ity good results on sustainability thanks 
to consistent levels of traffic; the negative 
impact of 9/11 has been overcome. PPP 
OPERATIONS EVALUATION
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projects are all expected to be sustain-
able, with the (private) providers having 
sound incentives to maintain them prop-
erly and, in general, satisfactory level of 
long-term revenues.
In almost all energy and transport projects 
in the MPCs, sustainability is rated satis-
factory or good; this reflects the fact that 
the promoters were competent and that 
they are strongly supported by their re-
spective governments (e.g. by keeping 
tariffs at a reasonable level).
Private sector projects are also satisfac-
tory thanks to the ability of the promoters 
to adapt to changes in the markets.
Recommendations
Individual loans in the MPCs 
The Bank should promote institu-
tional reforms, notably to contrib-
ute to increasing the efficiency of 
the public sector (often involving 
the private sector). This implies 
that the EIB is involved in insti-
tutional aspects and more up-
stream in the project cycle than in 
the past.
  The TA component (Technical 
Assistance Support Fund 
launched in 2003 and the 
FEMIP Trust Fund launched in 
2004) provides FEMIP with a 
strong instrument to improve 
the quality and the develop-
ment impact of its lending 
operations in MPCs. As a con-
sequence, FEMIP is now more 
proactive and selective, putting 
more emphasis on sustainabil-
ity and development.
These observations on sustainability have 
no financial impact on the EIB; the evalu-
ation has not identified one single case 
where the Bank could be at risk as far as 
repayments of its own resource loans are 
concerned.
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Case study: 
Extension of a waste water collection and 
treatment system in a large MPC city
Relevance is good:
The project financed is an important component of the 
city’s waste water system; crucial for the protection of public 
health. However, waste water final disposal at the country 
level is still unsatisfactory as bacteriological pollution is not 
controlled.
Project overall performance is satisfactory:
•  The project was implemented with only a short delay (less than six months) and was almost on cost, with an extended definition 
in line with the initial technical description.
•  The economic profitability should be better than expected given the extended characteristics of the projects, including signifi-
cant unquantified economic benefits.
•  But sustainability is unsatisfactory: the waste water company is dependent on public sector decisions for tariff increases. Against 
contractual undertakings, tariffs have not been increased and the financial sustainability of the company is in danger.
The EIB financial value added is high, as the loan benefited from a 3% interest subsidy (financed through the EC MEDA budget), 
being an environmental loan in the MED mandate. The Bank also provided implicit political support, helping to secure government 
financing of the project.
The Bank’s role at the definition stage was important: a METAP study (EIB grant through the “Mediterranean Environmental 
Technical Assistance Programme”) helped to clearly define the scope and the calendar of the project. It demonstrates the im-
portance of Technical Assistance in complex infrastructure projects. However, monitoring was then unsatisfactory, with fewer 
contacts and weak reactions to the absence of increase in tariffs. 
On the whole, the project is considered satisfactory, having contributed to the improvement of living standards in a large coun-
try, illustrating the difficulties which a “non productive public investment” faces. More involvement of the Bank would be needed 
during the project cycle.
OPERATIONS EVALUATION
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with one exception, these represented 
between 22 and 45% of loan portfolios. 
Despite the challenges faced, all FIs re-
act quickly and positively to economic 
changes. All except one FI were consid-
ered sustainable, the exception being a 
state-owned mono-sectoral bank, with 
heavy, unsustainable, government-driv-
en policies (this bank has now been com-
pletely restructured).
The global loan performance is uneven: 
only half of the operations were good 
or satisfactory. In 2 cases, the allocation 
period had to be significantly increased 
together with sector eligibility. One spe-
cialised global loan (financing environ-
mental projects) was not utilised, the 
loan product being replaced by grants. 
Finally, in one case, the Bank stopped its 
disbursements when the FI’s difficulties 
became too severe (see exception in pre-
vious paragraph).
3.2. Global loans
a.  In the European Union, the perform-
ance of global loan operations has 
been evaluated from the Financial 
Intermediary perspective, which has 
been satisfactory or better. 
This has been achieved through a long 
cooperation with most of the Financial 
Intermediaries (FIs) and a well-established 
financial product which has evolved with 
time and adapted itself to a changing 
environment.
The Financial Intermediaries were all in 
good standing with the Bank, the various 
rating agencies, and their national regu-
lator. All complied with normal pruden-
tial ratios and all except one had wholly 
satisfactory levels of credit losses. The 
exception was a FI which specifically ac-
cepts higher risk operations in line with 
government policy. All FIs evaluated were 
considered sustainable.
Commitments and disbursements of the 
global loans were satisfactory, except for 
2 operations which experienced some 
delays due to the learning curve. Clients 
were informed of the EIB funding. On-
lending conditions were satisfactory, 
while the quality of the investments fi-
nanced could be implicitly considered 
satisfactory through the measure of the 
quality of relevant portfolios in the FIs.
b.  In the MPCs, the performance of 
global loan operations is less regular, 
given the diversity of the intermediar-
ies and less mature financial sectors.
The FI performance was satisfactory in 6 
cases out of 8 (while no rating was estab-
lished for 2 operations signed with mul-
tiple FIs). The main problems facing the 
banking sector in the region is the high 
proportion of non-performing loans; 
Recommendations 
Global loans in MPCs
When necessary, the Bank should as-
sist FIs through technical assistance, 
thereby encouraging their develop-
ment and financial sector reform. 
Such programmes also need to be 
carefully co-ordinated with other do-
nors to avoid over-lapping or duplica-
tion of effort.
  The Bank is already assisting FIs in 
the region, when appropriate, using 
the FEMIP Technical Assistance 
(TA) facility. The main objective of 
on-going TA operations is capacity 
building at the FI level, where other 
donors are rarely found. TA is being 
considered for sector reform under 
the Trust Fund, in full coordination 
with other donors.
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The Financial Value Added of the Bank is 
broadly significant. The terms of the EIB 
loans are appropriate and particularly 
interesting for the grace periods and the 
durations offered. 
In a number of cases, which were more 
reflected in the global loans within the 
financial sector, the promoters signalled 
some concerns about the future. This fur-
ther emphasizes the need for a change in 
policy towards SME finance as mentioned 
above for the EU (see § 2.3) and below 
outside the EU.
EV identified the more specific role the 
Bank could play when dealing with in-
novative operations combining financ-
ing technology and new organisation or 
management structure such as PPPs (see 
evaluation highlights).
In the MPCs, the financial products of-
fered by the Bank were deficient for the 
development of private sector opera-
tions where the Bank guarantee require-
ments are too costly, and for global loans 
where the need of local currency finance 
is critical.
4.2 EIB as a facilitator
The Bank is often considered as a facili-
tator for the consolidation of financial 
resources. 
The implicit support was particularly 
relevant in the PPP operations financed, 
where suggestions are made for increas-
ing the role of the Bank.  However, it was 
also true for the railway sector, where the 
Bank has shown itself to be innovative, 
and in the MPCs where the financing of 
the Bank was sometimes decisive for the 
realisation of the projects.
Recommendations
PPP
A number of promoters would have benefited from guidance and support when 
variable rate funding was being swapped into fixed. The Bank could offer guidance 
to less experienced promoters.
  Promoters on PPP projects normally employ financial advisors who are best placed 
to offer guidance and support on these matters. For less sophisticated promoters, 
who do not have access to suitable advisors, support can be envisaged on an ad-
hoc basis
PPPs offer substantial opportunities for the Bank to add value. The Bank should 
therefore reinforce the existing Centre of Expertise (CoE) and consider establishing a 
horizontal department specialised in structured finance operations including PPPs.
  The Bank can provide significant value added in the case of PPP structures and 
the CoE guarantees the sharing of experiences. Externally, this is also reflected by 
the work related to the setting up of the European PPP Expertise centre (EPEC). 
Internally, this is complemented by the creation as of January 2006 of a horizontal 
department (AGI, Action for Growth Instruments), which follows EPEC, provides PPP 
support to the geographical lending units and also co-ordinates the existing CoE.
4. EIB CONTRIBUTION
4.1. Financial Value Added
One of the important contributions made 
by the Bank to a project or towards a pro-
moter is its “Financial Value Added” (the 
third pillar on EIB’s value added). In addi-
tion, the Bank’s expertise can be utilised 
in some sectors, or for some specific ac-
tions, when required and /or justified.
High/Significant
85%
Medium/Low
15%
Financial Value Added
All operations
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Recommendations
Individual loans in MPCs 
 In order to increase its financial value added when financing private projects, the 
Bank needs to expand its range of products, in particular taking more risks.
  With the reinforced FEMIP, the “Special FEMIP Envelope” (SFE) aims to address some 
of the constraints created by the MPCs’ relatively poor credit ratings and the Bank’s 
usual requirements on private sector borrowers.
Global loans in MPCs 
Adapt guarantee requirements for global loans, enabling the Bank to finance more 
private sector banks without the requirements of a government guarantee and offer 
new products, such as financing in local currencies.
  The Bank’s operational directorates have accepted this recommendation with limi-
tations due to local context for local currency issues and lending.
  With the “Reinforced FEMIP”, the Bank can lend to eligible local banks without 
government or international guarantees under the “Special FEMIP Envelope”. 
Consideration is given to the provision of financing in local currencies in order to 
enhance the competitiveness of the Bank’s loans.
4.3 Other Contributions
With the expertise available at the EIB, the 
Bank’s contribution could be improved in 
other areas such as project preparation, 
institutional development and project 
implementation. The use of Technical 
Assistance Funds, when available, could 
be decisive.
The various remarks below were already 
mentioned but should be highlighted in 
order to improve the Bank’s non-financial 
contribution.
In the infrastructure sector, an en-
hanced co-operation with the European 
Commission could improve the sound-
ness of projects while the EIB experi-
ence with PPPs should be disseminated. 
Outside the EU, the Bank’s contribution 
was high in the preparation of projects 
in the water sector and in the transport 
sector, although improvements are now 
possible with the use of TA funds.
In the MPCs, EV identified the need for 
improvements in the financial sector 
which could not be provided and lead to 
deficiencies in the management of some 
operations.
The TA funds are now used for capacity 
building, the TA is being considered for 
sector reform under the Trust Fund in full 
coordination with other donors.
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EVALUATION HIGHLIGHTS OF THE YEAR
Private-Public Partnerships: Pre-requisites for Prime Performance
The growth of PPPs may be seen as being part of a wider change in the role of the State from a direct provider of services to 
that of a facilitator and regulator. There is clear EU support for the use of private funding for public infrastructure, and for the 
EIB to play a major role in that process.
These vary from country to country and sector to sector, but they normally involve the private sector building, operating and 
maintaining a well-defined piece of public infrastructure for a set period, with a sharing of risks between the public and private 
sectors.  
The Impact of PPPs on project implementation
The Bank is one of the largest lenders to PPPs in the EU and has funded projects in most EU countries as well as in some partner 
countries. A particular challenge for the Bank is the dual role it has to play: lender to the private sector provider, and mentor 
to the public sector promoter which may have much less experience in PPPs than the Bank. There is a danger of a confusion of 
objectives and loyalties in this type of situation but the Bank, or to be more accurate the staff involved, handled the transition 
well.
In each of the cases taken into consideration, the main reason for choosing the PPP route was to launch investment pro-
grammes that would not have been possible with the available public sector capital budget within a reasonable time. 
The evaluation found that there was a genuine sharing of risks between the public and private sectors. The EIB’s analyses of 
these projects confirmed the economic benefits, and usually found ancillary environmental or social benefits.  
It has been argued that PPPs foster innovation in design and operation of a project because while the public sector defines a 
specified output, it is normally the private sector provider who determines how it is delivered. However, the evaluation found 
only anecdotal evidence to support this thesis. It is also suggested that PPPs have the potential to bring private sector man-
agement and implementation skills to the public sector. Again, the Evaluation found no evidence to support this and did find 
one case of technical skills being transferred from the public sector to the private sector. Finally, one could argue that lenders 
bring external discipline to the project. This argument was supported by the findings. In several of the projects evaluated, both 
the public and private partners agreed that intervention by the lenders, including the EIB, in the PPP contract and subcontract 
negotiation processes produced a better deal.
EIB value added
While issues of loan term and repayment profile were important, the most important reason for the EIB being brought into 
the projects was its lower ‘all-in’ cost of financing. However, other types of value added from the Bank’s presence could also be 
identified, particularly in new PPP markets: the development of third party funding, scale of involvement, the transfer of PPP 
experience from one country to another, the willingness to stay aboard for the long-term, and political effects. Public sector 
promoters saw the exposure to the Bank’s skills and the opportunity to learn from the Bank’s experience as a valuable aspect 
of having the Bank involved. Overall, although not a Bank policy objective, it was clear that the Bank has a positive impact on 
institutional development, particularly in countries at an early stage of PPP development.  
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Pre-requisites for Prime Performance
There is no general formula for successful PPPs; but there are clear indications on how to avoid problems. One is that projects 
should have clear boundaries and a fixed definition/specification. The contractual complexities of most PPPs mean that change 
will be expensive. Another indication is that the underlying project must be economically and financially sustainable: the PPP 
mechanism will tend to magnify project deficiencies. Thirdly, competition must be maintained to minimise costs. Finally, for 
PPPs to provide value for money, the private sector providers need to carry risk - but it must be risks which it can quantify, 
mitigate and manage. 
In sum, PPPs are not a panacea for public expenditure. They create new problems for the public sector promoters, private sec-
tor providers and financing bodies to solve. However, in the right circumstances, they can make public infrastructure available 
earlier, more effectively, and more efficiently than traditional public procurement.
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5.2 Appraisal
The appraisal process in the Bank is well 
managed and follows strict procedures 
which is reflected in the 85% of satisfac-
tory / good appraisals.
Various issues were addressed to in the 
evaluations presented, which were trans-
lated in some specific recommendations.
Recommendations
•  Improvements in economic analy-
sis for large-scale and long-term 
transport projects.
   Procedures have already been 
updated.
•  Improvements in the analysis of 
the Financial Intermediaries’ abil-
ity to work with the Bank (for glo-
bal loans).
   The new “appraisal framework 
for global loans” is dealing with 
this; outside the EU, the use of 
FEMIP TA funds is considered 
when appropriate.
5.  EIB MANAGEMENT OF 
THE PROJECT CYCLE
EV has considered three main steps in 
the management of the project cycle: 
identification, appraisal, and monitoring, 
both during implementation and after 
completion.
5.1  Identification and 
selection
Projects and / or Intermediaries sup-
ported by the Bank are often identified 
through ongoing relationships with 
public authorities, sector representatives 
and existing promoters or borrowers. The 
selection process allows an examination 
of project eligibility and the likelihood of 
a positive outcome of the appraisal pro-
cess, based on preparatory work generally
performed by the promoter.
As such, the identification process of the 
operations to finance was considered sat-
isfactory in all cases analysed.
Nevertheless the negative outcome of 
certain projects justifies some recom-
mendations for improving the role of the 
Bank in this phase in order to support 
better preparation of the investments, 
either by working more closely with 
other stakeholders such as the European 
Commission, or by making full use of 
Technical Assistance Funds, when avail-
able. This has already been signalled for 
the railways sector (see § 2.1 and § 3.1) 
and in the MPCs (see § 3.1).
Good/Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory/Poor
86%
14%
Global loans
15%
85%
Average
Individual loans
84%
16%
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5.3 Monitoring
Only 66% of the operations evaluated 
were rated good or satisfactory as far as 
monitoring is concerned.
This situation had already been flagged 
in previous evaluations. At the end of 
2004, the Management Committee took 
decisions in favour of the reinforcement 
of the monitoring during implementa-
tion and of self-evaluation. Effective re-
sults are expected during the year 2006 
as this involves job creations and new 
staff training.
The main targets of these new procedures 
are investment loans and framework 
loans. More specifically, in the railways 
sector, the evaluation recognised the al-
ready high level of monitoring but still 
recommended it to be better performed, 
given the low rating on delays and costs, 
i.e. project implementation.
For global loans in the EU, long-estab-
lished relations with the FIs allow for a 
sound knowledge of their competences 
and therefore light monitoring of the 
operations. Outside the EU, weaknesses 
identified by the evaluators demonstrate 
the uneven levels of relations with the 
FIs.
Case study: 
Global loan for financing SMEs 
in an MPC
The Financial Intermediary (FI) is a pub-
lic sector bank providing equity, loans 
and services supporting, as a priority, 
export oriented firms and tourism de-
velopment. The objective of the global 
loan is to strengthen competitiveness 
of exporting companies and forex earn-
ings in the SME sector. These objectives 
have been complied with and were fully 
in line with EU and country objectives.
The FI is well managed and presents satisfactory financial statements; neverthe-
less, due to downturns in the local economy, non-performing loans have sharply 
increased between 2000 and 2003 (to a high ratio of 22%); this situation is under 
control: provisions have increased and the FI has introduced risk management con-
trol. This situation deserves more attention from the EIB (increased monitoring). 
The global loan was fully allocated to 14 investments; 80% of the Final Beneficiaries 
(FB) were companies of more than 100 people, illustrating the fact that the FI con-
centrates on the larger end of the SME sector. All the projects are performing well; 
the FI complies with EIB requirements for environmental management (an environ-
mental fiche was always annexed to the allocation request sent to the EIB).
The financial value added is high for both the FI and the FBs who are aware of the EIB 
funding. The EIB loan has financed 31% of the overall projects costs.
To the question: “Would TA have improved the performance of the operation?”, 
the evaluation answer is yes, for developing the FI’s ability to finance smaller 
enterprises.
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Annex:
EVALUATION PROCESS AND CRITERIA
Project performance is assessed using the core evaluation criteria as defined by the 
Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG), which brings together the operations evaluation 
units of the multilateral development banks (World Bank group, regional development 
banks, and EIB), in line with the work of the OECD- DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation, 
and adapted to meet the particular operating needs of the EIB. Evaluations take due 
account of the analytical criteria used in the ex-ante project appraisal and the strategy, 
policies and procedures that relate to the operations evaluated. Changes in EIB policies 
or procedures following project appraisal, which are relevant to the assessment of the 
project, will also be taken into account.
1. Relevance to EU, EIB and countries policies 
(First Pillar of value added sheet for individual operations)
Relevance is the extent to which the objectives of a project are consistent with EU poli-
cies, as defined by the Treaty, Directives, Council Decisions, Mandates, etc.., the decisions 
of the EIB Governors, as well as the beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global 
priorities and partners’ policies. In the EU, reference is made to the relevant EU and EIB 
policies and specifically to the Article 267 of the Treaty which defines the mission of the 
Bank. Outside the Union, the main reference are the policy objectives considered in the 
relevant mandates.
2. Project performance
(Second Pillar of value added sheet for individual operations)
•  Effectiveness (or efficacy) relates to the extent to which the objectives of the project 
have been achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their rela-
tive importance, while recognising any change introduced in the project since loan 
approval.
•  Efficiency concerns the extent to which project benefits/outputs are commensurate 
with resources/inputs. At ex-ante appraisal, project’ efficiency is normally measured 
through the economic and financial rates of return. In public sector projects a finan-
cial rate of return is often not calculated ex-ante, in which case the efficiency of the 
project is estimated by a cost effectiveness analysis. 
•  Sustainability is the likelihood of continued long-term benefits and the resilience to 
risk over the intended life of the project. The assessment of project sustainability var-
ies substantially from case to case depending on circumstances, and takes into ac-
count the issues identified in the ex-ante due-diligence carried out by the Bank. 
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3. EIB contribution
•  EIB Financial value added (Third Pillar of value added sheet for individual operations) 
identifies the financial value added provided in relation to the alternatives available, 
including improvements on financial aspects as facilitating co-financing from other 
sources (catalytic effect).
•  Other EIB contribution (optional) relates to any significant non-financial contribution 
to the operation provided by the EIB; it may take the form of improvements of the 
technical, economic or other aspects of the project.
4. EIB management of the project cycle
EIB Management of the project cycle rates the Bank’s handling of the operation, from 
project identification and selection to post completion monitoring.
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GLOSSARY
ACP Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
AfDB African Development Bank
ALA Asia, Latin America
ATM Air Traffic Management
CoE Centre of Expertise
DAC Development Cooperation Directorate of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
DG TREN Directorate-General Energy and Transport of the European Commission
EC European Commission
ECG Evaluation Cooperation Group
EIB European Investment Bank
EIB Group European Investment Bank and European Investment Fund
EU European Union
EV Operations Evaluation of the EIB
FB Final Beneficiary
FEMIP Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership
FI Financial Intermediary
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
MED mandate Mediterranean mandate
MEDA Financial instrument of the European Union for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
METAP Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance Programme
MLT loan Medium to Long Term loan
MPCs Mediterranean Partner Countries
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PPP Public Private Partnership
SFE Special FEMIP Envelop
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
TA Technical Assistance
TEN Trans-European Networks

European Investment Bank
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